%%% -*- erlang -*- %%% %%% This file is part of hackney released under the Apache 2 license. %%% See the NOTICE for more information. %%% %%% Copyright (c) 2011-2012, Loïc Hoguin -module(hackney_ssl). -compile({parse_transform, ct_expand}). -export([messages/1, connect/3, connect/4, recv/3, recv/2, send/2, setopts/2, controlling_process/2, peername/1, peercert/1, close/1, shutdown/2, sockname/1]). -export([check_hostname_opts/1]). -export([cipher_opts/0]). -export([ssl_opts/2]). -export([effective_opts/3]). -export([effective_opts_and_key/3]). -export([init_key_cache/0]). -export([options_key/1]). -export([h3_options_key/2]). -define(TLS_KEY_CACHE, hackney_tls_keys). -define(TLS_KEY_CACHE_MAX, 512). %% ALPN (Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation) for HTTP/2 -export([alpn_opts/1]). -export([get_negotiated_protocol/1]). %% @doc Atoms used to identify messages in {active, once | true} mode. messages(_) -> {ssl, ssl_closed, ssl_error}. %% @doc Build SSL options for a connection. %% Used by proxy modules for SSL upgrade after tunnel establishment. ssl_opts(Host, Options) -> case proplists:get_value(ssl_options, Options) of undefined -> ssl_opts_1(Host, Options); [] -> ssl_opts_1(Host, Options); SSLOpts -> merge_ssl_opts(Host, SSLOpts, Options) end. ssl_opts_1(Host, Options) -> Insecure = proplists:get_value(insecure, Options, false), case Insecure of true -> [{verify, verify_none} | cipher_opts()]; false -> check_hostname_opts(Host) ++ cipher_opts() end. merge_ssl_opts(Host, OverrideOpts, Options) -> %% Verify against the chosen SNI: a user hostname wins, `disable' and no %% SNI both verify against Host. effective_opts no longer prepends a %% duplicate SNI, so the wire SNI and the verify target now agree. VerifyHost = case proplists:get_value(server_name_indication, OverrideOpts) of undefined -> Host; disable -> Host; SNI -> SNI end, %% Check insecure from top-level Options first, then fall back to ssl_options (fixes #786) Insecure = proplists:get_value(insecure, Options, proplists:get_value(insecure, OverrideOpts, false)), DefaultOpts = case Insecure of true -> [{verify, verify_none} | cipher_opts()]; false -> check_hostname_opts(VerifyHost) ++ cipher_opts() end, MergedOpts = orddict:merge(fun(_K, _V1, V) -> V end, orddict:from_list(DefaultOpts), orddict:from_list(OverrideOpts)), %% If cacertfile was provided in override opts remove cacerts case lists:keymember(cacertfile, 1, MergedOpts) of true -> lists:keydelete(cacerts, 1, MergedOpts); false -> MergedOpts end. %% @doc Build the exact options handed to `ssl:connect/2' for an SSL upgrade. %% SslOpts is the caller's ssl_options, with an optional `{protocols, P}' %% entry prepended when the request carries one. ConnectOpts is only used %% as the ALPN fallback when SslOpts yields no ALPN protocols. Computing %% the final list once, caller-side, lets `options_key/1' hash the same %% term the handshake uses. %% %% Requests on hackney's default TLS config (no user ssl_options) also get %% `{session_tickets, auto}' for TLS 1.3 session resumption, unless the %% `tls_session_resumption' application env is set to false or the node %% pins the ssl app to versions without 'tlsv1.3'. Custom ssl_options %% deliberately never get resumption: OTP's automatic ticket store is %% global per node and keyed by SNI, not by trust options, and a %% PSK-resumed handshake skips certificate validation. Restricting it to %% the default config means every participant in the store has identical %% trust, so trust configs cannot cross by construction. -spec effective_opts(string(), list(), list()) -> list(). effective_opts(Host, SslOpts, ConnectOpts) -> %% Resolve SNI once: a user-supplied server_name_indication (a hostname or %% `disable') wins; otherwise default to Host, unless Host is an IP literal %% (RFC 6066 forbids SNI for IP literals), in which case emit none. SslOpts1 = case lists:keymember(server_name_indication, 1, SslOpts) of true -> SslOpts; false -> case hackney_url:is_ip_literal(Host) of true -> SslOpts; false -> [{server_name_indication, Host} | SslOpts] end end, Merged = ssl_opts(Host, [{ssl_options, SslOpts1}]), Alpn = case alpn_opts(SslOpts1) of [] -> alpn_opts(ConnectOpts); AlpnOpts -> AlpnOpts end, Final0 = hackney_util:merge_opts(Merged, Alpn), %% `protocols' is a hackney option, not an ssl one; keep it out of the %% handshake options. Final = proplists:delete(protocols, Final0), case resumption_allowed(SslOpts) of true -> [{session_tickets, auto} | Final]; false -> Final end. %% @private Resumption only for the default TLS config: the caller injects %% at most a `protocols' entry, so deleting it leaves [] exactly when the %% user passed no ssl_options (hence no insecure, versions or %% session_tickets overrides by construction). resumption_allowed(SslOpts) -> proplists:delete(protocols, SslOpts) =:= [] andalso hackney_app:get_app_env(tls_session_resumption, true) =:= true andalso tlsv13_allowed(). %% @private OTP rejects `session_tickets' when 'tlsv1.3' is not among the %% effective versions (ssl_config asserts the version dependency), so honor %% a node-wide ssl `protocol_version' pin that excludes TLS 1.3. tlsv13_allowed() -> case application:get_env(ssl, protocol_version) of undefined -> true; {ok, 'tlsv1.3'} -> true; {ok, Versions} when is_list(Versions) -> lists:member('tlsv1.3', Versions); {ok, _} -> false end. %% @doc Create the TLS key memo table used by `effective_opts_and_key/3'. %% Idempotent; called from hackney_sup:init/1. -spec init_key_cache() -> ok. init_key_cache() -> case ets:info(?TLS_KEY_CACHE) of undefined -> ?TLS_KEY_CACHE = ets:new(?TLS_KEY_CACHE, [set, public, named_table, {read_concurrency, true}]), ok; _ -> ok end. %% @doc Like `effective_opts/3' but also return `options_key/1' of the %% result, memoized in a bounded ETS cache. Building the options is cheap; %% hashing them is not (sha256 over the full term, dominated by the certifi %% CA bundle), so only the hash is cached. The memo key is the small %% pre-merge inputs plus `env_fingerprint/0', so a runtime env flip yields %% a fresh key instead of hashing connections into wrong pool buckets. -spec effective_opts_and_key(string(), list(), list()) -> {list(), binary()}. effective_opts_and_key(Host, SslOpts, ConnectOpts) -> Final = effective_opts(Host, SslOpts, ConnectOpts), MemoKey = {Host, SslOpts, ConnectOpts, env_fingerprint()}, try case ets:lookup(?TLS_KEY_CACHE, MemoKey) of [{_, Key}] -> {Final, Key}; [] -> Key = options_key(Final), %% The bound is soft under concurrency; the cache is best-effort. case ets:info(?TLS_KEY_CACHE, size) >= ?TLS_KEY_CACHE_MAX of true -> _ = ets:delete_all_objects(?TLS_KEY_CACHE); false -> ok end, _ = ets:insert(?TLS_KEY_CACHE, {MemoKey, Key}), {Final, Key} end catch %% Table absent: hackney used as a library without the app started. error:badarg -> {Final, options_key(Final)} end. %% @private Invariant: this tuple must cover every mutable read inside %% effective_opts/3 (default_protocols via alpn_opts, the %% tls_session_resumption env via resumption_allowed, the ssl %% protocol_version env via tlsv13_allowed). Extend it whenever %% effective_opts/3 grows a new env read, or stale keys get served. env_fingerprint() -> {hackney_util:default_protocols(), hackney_app:get_app_env(tls_session_resumption, true), application:get_env(ssl, protocol_version, undefined)}. %% @doc Hash the effective TLS options into a pool key component. %% 2-tuples are ukeysorted (first occurrence wins, preserving proplists %% lookup semantics) so option order does not change the key, while %% conflicting duplicates such as `[{verify,A},{verify,B}]' and its %% reverse still hash differently. -spec options_key(list()) -> binary(). options_key(FinalSslOpts) -> {Tuples, Rest} = lists:partition( fun(T) -> is_tuple(T) andalso tuple_size(T) =:= 2 end, FinalSslOpts), crypto:hash(sha256, term_to_binary({lists:ukeysort(1, Tuples), lists:usort(Rest)})). %% @doc Hash the QUIC trust projection of an HTTP/3 connection into a pool %% key component. Includes exactly what decides server trust on the QUIC %% handshake, mirroring `hackney_conn:h3_tls_opts/2': the verify mode %% derived from the `insecure' flag (read from ConnectOpts first, then %% SslOpts) and the CA source from SslOpts (the `cacerts' list, else the %% `cacertfile' path, else the default trust store). The cacertfile path is %% hashed as given, without reading the file. Deliberately excluded: %% `session_ticket' (injected per resumption, so the conn-side store key %% must not depend on it), and `family' and `happy_eyeballs' (connectivity %% options that do not affect trust). A user-supplied %% `server_name_indication' is included so requests to one host:port with %% different SNI do not share a QUIC connection; the default SNI is the host %% itself, already part of the outer pool key. -spec h3_options_key(list(), list()) -> binary(). h3_options_key(ConnectOpts, SslOpts) -> Insecure = proplists:get_value(insecure, ConnectOpts, proplists:get_value(insecure, SslOpts, false)), VerifyMode = case Insecure of true -> verify_none; false -> verify_peer end, CaSource = case proplists:get_value(cacerts, SslOpts) of undefined -> case proplists:get_value(cacertfile, SslOpts) of undefined -> default; File -> {cacertfile, File} end; CACerts -> {cacerts, CACerts} end, Sni = proplists:get_value(server_name_indication, SslOpts, default), crypto:hash(sha256, term_to_binary({VerifyMode, CaSource, Sni})). check_hostname_opts(Host0) -> Host1 = string:trim(Host0, trailing, "."), %% Rewrite cert_expired -> root_cert_expired so OTP's cross-sign recovery %% (find_cross_sign_root_paths/4) triggers; ssl_verify_hostname returns %% cert_expired verbatim, which bypasses it entirely. VerifyFun = { fun(_Cert, {bad_cert, cert_expired}, _State) -> {fail, {bad_cert, root_cert_expired}}; (Cert, Event, State) -> ssl_verify_hostname:verify_fun(Cert, Event, State) end, [{check_hostname, Host1}] }, SslOpts = [{verify, verify_peer}, {depth, 100}, {cacerts, certifi:cacerts()}, {partial_chain, fun partial_chain/1}, {verify_fun, VerifyFun}], check_hostname_opt(Host1, server_name_indication_opt(Host1, SslOpts)). -ifdef(buggy_chacha_ciphers). cipher_opts() -> % Workaround for buggy ChaCha cipher in OTP 20, which breaks connectivity sometimes. % See: https://bugs.erlang.org/browse/ERL-538 ct_expand:term( (fun () -> % This will be evaluated at compile time TLSVersionsInfo = ssl:versions(), {_, SupportedTLSVersions} = lists:keyfind(supported, 1, TLSVersionsInfo), DefaultCipherSuitesPerTLSVersion = [ssl:cipher_suites(default, TLSVersion) || TLSVersion <- SupportedTLSVersions], DefaultCipherSuites = lists:flatten(DefaultCipherSuitesPerTLSVersion), CipherFilter = fun (Cipher) -> Cipher =/= chacha20_poly1305 end, Ciphers = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(DefaultCipherSuites, [{cipher, CipherFilter}]), [{ciphers, Ciphers}] end)() ). -else. cipher_opts() -> []. -endif. -ifdef(no_customize_hostname_check). check_hostname_opt(_Host, Opts) -> Opts. -else. check_hostname_opt(_Host, Opts) -> MatchFun = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https), [{customize_hostname_check, [{match_fun, MatchFun}]} | Opts]. -endif. -ifdef(no_proxy_sni_support). server_name_indication_opt(_Host, Opts) -> Opts. -else. server_name_indication_opt(Host, Opts) -> case hackney_url:is_ip_literal(Host) of true -> Opts; false -> [{server_name_indication, Host} | Opts] end. -endif. %% code from rebar3 undert BSD license partial_chain(Certs) -> Certs1 = lists:reverse([{Cert, public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp)} || Cert <- Certs]), case find(fun({_, Cert}) -> check_cert(decoded_cacerts(), Cert) end, Certs1) of {ok, Trusted} -> {trusted_ca, element(1, Trusted)}; _ -> unknown_ca end. %% instead of parsing every time, compile this list at runtime decoded_cacerts() -> ct_expand:term( lists:foldl(fun(Cert, Acc) -> Dec = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), [hackney_ssl_certificate:public_key_info(Dec) | Acc] end, [], certifi:cacerts()) ). check_cert(CACerts, Cert) -> PublicKeyInfo = hackney_ssl_certificate:public_key_info(Cert), lists:member(PublicKeyInfo, CACerts). -spec find(fun(), list()) -> {ok, term()} | error. find(Fun, [Head|Tail]) when is_function(Fun) -> case Fun(Head) of true -> {ok, Head}; false -> find(Fun, Tail) end; find(_Fun, []) -> error. connect(Host, Port, Opts) -> connect(Host, Port, Opts, 30000). connect(Host, Port, Opts0, Timeout) when is_list(Host), is_integer(Port), (Timeout =:= infinity orelse is_integer(Timeout)) -> SSLOpts = proplists:get_value(ssl_options, Opts0), BaseOpts = [binary, {active, false}, {packet, raw}], Opts1 = hackney_util:merge_opts(BaseOpts, proplists:delete(ssl_options, Opts0)), Now = erlang:monotonic_time(millisecond), case hackney_happy:connect(Host, Port, Opts1, Timeout) of {ok, Sock} -> case Timeout of infinity -> ssl:connect(Sock, SSLOpts); _ -> Elapsed = erlang:monotonic_time(millisecond) - Now, case Timeout - Elapsed of TimeoutLeft when TimeoutLeft > 0 -> ssl:connect(Sock, SSLOpts, TimeoutLeft); _ -> gen_tcp:close(Sock), {error, timeout} end end; Error -> Error end. recv(Socket, Length) -> recv(Socket, Length, infinity). %% @doc Receive a packet from a socket in passive mode. %% @see ssl:recv/3 -spec recv(ssl:sslsocket(), non_neg_integer(), timeout()) -> {ok, any()} | {error, closed | atom()}. recv(Socket, Length, Timeout) -> ssl:recv(Socket, Length, Timeout). %% @doc Send a packet on a socket. %% @see ssl:send/2 -spec send(ssl:sslsocket(), iolist()) -> ok | {error, atom()}. send(Socket, Packet) -> ssl:send(Socket, Packet). %% @doc Set one or more options for a socket. %% @see ssl:setopts/2 -spec setopts(ssl:sslsocket(), list()) -> ok | {error, atom()}. setopts(Socket, Opts) -> ssl:setopts(Socket, Opts). %% @doc Assign a new controlling process Pid to Socket. %% @see ssl:controlling_process/2 -spec controlling_process(ssl:sslsocket(), pid()) -> ok | {error, closed | not_owner | atom()}. controlling_process(Socket, Pid) -> ssl:controlling_process(Socket, Pid). %% @doc Return the address and port for the other end of a connection. %% @see ssl:peername/1 -spec peername(ssl:sslsocket()) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, atom()}. peername(Socket) -> ssl:peername(Socket). %% @doc Return the peer certificate of an SSL connection. %% @see ssl:peercert/1 -spec peercert(ssl:sslsocket()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, atom()}. peercert(Socket) -> ssl:peercert(Socket). %% @doc Close a TCP socket. %% @see ssl:close/1 -spec close(ssl:sslsocket()) -> ok. close(Socket) -> ssl:close(Socket). %% @doc Immediately close a socket in one or two directions. %% @see ssl:shutdown/2 -spec shutdown(ssl:sslsocket(), read | write | read_write) -> ok | {error, any()}. shutdown(Socket, How) -> ssl:shutdown(Socket, How). %% @doc Get the local address and port of a socket %% @see ssl:sockname/1 -spec sockname(ssl:sslsocket()) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, atom()}. sockname(Socket) -> ssl:sockname(Socket). %%==================================================================== %% ALPN (Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation) for HTTP/2 %%==================================================================== %% @doc Generate ALPN options for SSL connection. %% Returns a list containing alpn_advertised_protocols option based on %% the protocols specified in Options. %% %% Options: %% - protocols: list of atoms [http3, http2, http1] (default: [http2, http1]) %% Order matters - first protocol is preferred %% Note: http3 is only used for informational purposes here - HTTP/3 uses %% QUIC which has its own ALPN negotiation handled by hackney_http3. %% %% Example: %% ``` %% alpn_opts([{protocols, [http2, http1]}]) -> %% [{alpn_advertised_protocols, [<<"h2">>, <<"http/1.1">>]}] %% ''' -spec alpn_opts(list()) -> list(). alpn_opts(Opts) -> case proplists:get_value(protocols, Opts, hackney_util:default_protocols()) of Protos when is_list(Protos), Protos =/= [] -> %% Filter out http3 - it doesn't use TLS ALPN TlsProtos = [P || P <- Protos, P =/= http3], case TlsProtos of [] -> []; _ -> AlpnProtos = [proto_to_alpn(P) || P <- TlsProtos], [{alpn_advertised_protocols, AlpnProtos}] end; _ -> [] end. %% @doc Get the negotiated protocol after SSL handshake. %% Returns http2 if HTTP/2 was negotiated, http1 otherwise. %% Note: HTTP/3 is not returned here as it uses QUIC, not TLS. %% @see ssl:negotiated_protocol/1 -spec get_negotiated_protocol(ssl:sslsocket()) -> http2 | http1. get_negotiated_protocol(SslSocket) -> case ssl:negotiated_protocol(SslSocket) of {ok, <<"h2">>} -> http2; {ok, <<"http/1.1">>} -> http1; {error, protocol_not_negotiated} -> http1; _ -> http1 end. %% @private Convert protocol atom to ALPN protocol identifier -spec proto_to_alpn(http2 | http1 | http11) -> binary(). proto_to_alpn(http2) -> <<"h2">>; proto_to_alpn(http1) -> <<"http/1.1">>; proto_to_alpn(http11) -> <<"http/1.1">>.