Sobelow.DOS.Zip (Sobelow v0.19.0)

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Resource exhaustion through ZIP extraction

:zip.unzip/1,2, :zip.extract/1,2 and :zip.zip_get/1,2 can expand untrusted archives without a limit on actual output bytes. A single entry can exhaust memory, disk space or CPU; nested archives are not required. The :memory, :file_list and :file_filter options do not establish an expanded-byte limit. ZIP-declared sizes can be forged.

Enforce per-entry and cumulative actual-output limits during bounded decompression, before allocating or writing the entire output. Also bound entry count, compressed input and execution resources. A size check after extraction is too late. A bounded preflight must inspect the same immutable archive data and byte ranges that subsequent extraction will consume.

This check reports dynamic archive inputs and handles. Controller parameters influencing archive input receive medium confidence; other inputs and handles receive low confidence. Fully literal inputs are omitted, but a fixed filename can still contain untrusted data. Archive provenance and custom preflight validators are not verified. Inline :zip.foldl/3 callbacks are reported only when they directly invoke the third (entry-content) accessor before rebinding it. Findings point at the enclosing foldl call and use its archive input. Metadata-only callbacks, delegated/guarded callbacks, accessor aliases and invocations in nested scopes or branching constructs are not tracked. Archive creation is omitted. Audit bounded wrappers before skipping them.

https://www.erlang.org/doc/apps/stdlib/zip.html

Ignore this check with:

$ mix sobelow -i DOS.Zip

Summary

Functions

details()

id()

parse_def(fun)

rule()

run(fun, meta_file)