Sobelow.DOS.Tar (Sobelow v0.19.0)

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Potential resource exhaustion in TAR extraction

:erl_tar.extract/1,2 can consume memory, disk space and execution resources when extracting untrusted archives. Compressed input and sparse entries can amplify resource use. Selected files, disk write chunks and post-extraction checks do not establish a cumulative expanded-byte budget.

This check reports dynamic filenames, binary archives and archive handles. Controller parameters receive medium confidence; other inputs receive low confidence. Fully literal inputs and metadata/creation APIs are omitted. Literal paths can still refer to untrusted content. This is not a path traversal check and does not establish exploitability or input provenance.

Use runtime-supported cumulative extraction limits, plus limits on entry count, input, concurrency and execution resources. OTP 29 adds :max_size; it is not a portable protection on older supported OTP releases. Consequently this check does not suppress calls based on that option or custom preflights. Audit bounded wrappers before applying a targeted skip.

Ignore this check with:

$ mix sobelow -i DOS.Tar

Summary

Functions

details()

id()

parse_def(fun)

rule()

run(fun, meta_file)