Sobelow.DOS.Tar (Sobelow v0.19.0)
View SourcePotential resource exhaustion in TAR extraction
:erl_tar.extract/1,2 can consume memory, disk space and execution resources
when extracting untrusted archives. Compressed input and sparse entries can
amplify resource use. Selected files, disk write chunks and post-extraction
checks do not establish a cumulative expanded-byte budget.
This check reports dynamic filenames, binary archives and archive handles. Controller parameters receive medium confidence; other inputs receive low confidence. Fully literal inputs and metadata/creation APIs are omitted. Literal paths can still refer to untrusted content. This is not a path traversal check and does not establish exploitability or input provenance.
Use runtime-supported cumulative extraction limits, plus limits on entry
count, input, concurrency and execution resources. OTP 29 adds :max_size;
it is not a portable protection on older supported OTP releases. Consequently
this check does not suppress calls based on that option or custom preflights.
Audit bounded wrappers before applying a targeted skip.
Ignore this check with:
$ mix sobelow -i DOS.Tar