PtcRunner MCP Server

ptc_runner_mcp is a long-running process that speaks Model Context Protocol over stdio JSON-RPC by default, with an opt-in Streamable HTTP listener for private-network deployments. It advertises the MCP server name ptc_lisp and exposes lisp_eval to MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Claude Code, MCP Inspector, agentic applications, …). The tool accepts a PTC-Lisp program plus optional context and output_schema, runs it in an isolated BEAM sandbox, and returns a structured result.

The server has no LLM of its own. The MCP client's LLM does the reasoning; PtcRunner is invoked only when deterministic computation is useful — counting, filtering, JSON shape validation, schema-driven extraction. State does not persist between calls; each tools/call is independent unless the server is started with the optional session tools enabled.

Several capabilities are opt-in and add their own top-level tools:

• Aggregator mode lets PTC-Lisp programs call configured upstream MCP servers via (tool/call ...).
• Agentic mode adds lisp_task, a natural-language task tool backed by a planner LLM (requires aggregator mode).
• Stateful sessions add lisp_session_* tools that persist (def ...) bindings, the last three results, and bounded history.
• lisp_debug exposes in-process telemetry rollups for diagnostics.

lisp_eval and lisp_session_eval are rendered through one of three response profiles (slim / structured / debug), defaulting to slim. Those profiles also control client-facing output limits for prints, feedback, schema-validated values, and final envelope size. Oversized validated values are exact-or-absent: the server omits validated and returns validated_preview, validated_bytes, and output_truncated metadata instead of putting a partial value under validated.

This document is the conceptual overview. For install + client configuration, see mcp_server/README.md; for every flag and environment variable, see docs/mcp-server-configuration.md. For HTTP deployment, see docs/mcp-server-http-deployment.md. For the PTC-Lisp language itself, see docs/ptc-lisp-specification.md.

When to use it

Reach for the MCP server when the calling LLM needs deterministic compute and you want that capability available across MCP clients — not just from Elixir.

Concrete cases:

• Counting that LLMs get wrong. The classic "how many rs in raspberry" failure mode. A two-line PTC-Lisp program counts reliably; the LLM consumes the result.
• Arithmetic over data the LLM has already seen. Sum a list of order totals, average a column, compute a percentile — without trusting the model's mental math.
• JSON shape validation. Pass an output_schema to assert the result is {count :int, sum :int}; on mismatch the response carries a validation_error the model can self-correct from.
• Schema-validated extraction. Filter a JSON array down to records matching some condition and return them as a typed, programmatic value the calling client can consume directly.
• Cross-server orchestration. With aggregator mode on, one PTC-Lisp program can fan out to several configured upstream MCP servers, reduce the results, and return the collapsed answer — typically an order of magnitude fewer bytes than the LLM doing the same work N round-trips at a time.
• Filtering or reshaping a structured payload that already lives in the conversation. A small PTC-Lisp program is cheaper and more reliable than a long natural-language transformation.

It is not the right fit when the work needs filesystem access or direct network access. PTC-Lisp programs have none of those, by construction. If the work needs REPL-like memory across calls, the MCP server can optionally expose stateful PTC-Lisp session tools.

Comparison with Python / JS execution servers

Other "code interpreter" MCP servers exist. Most run Python or JavaScript inside a container or a process sandbox. The trade-offs look like this:

The PtcRunner pitch in one line: the sandbox is the language, not the deployment. Other servers ship a general-purpose interpreter and ask the operator to lock it down. PtcRunner ships an interpreter that cannot leak in the first place.

Architecture

                       MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, …)
                       or trusted private-network HTTP client
                                    │  stdio NDJSON or Streamable HTTP
                                    ▼
                  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
                  │              ptc_runner_mcp             │
                  │                                         │
                  │   Stdio transport or HTTP session        │
                  │              │                          │
                  │              ▼                          │
                  │   JSON-RPC dispatcher                   │
                  │   (initialize, tools/list,              │
                  │    tools/call, notifications/cancelled, │
                  │    shutdown, exit)                      │
                  │              │                          │
                  │              ▼                          │
                  │   Per-call worker  ◄── concurrency      │
                  │   process              semaphore        │
                  │              │                          │
                  │              ▼                          │
                  │   PtcToolProtocol.lisp_run/2            │
                  │              │                          │
                  └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┘
                                 ▼
                       :ptc_runner library
                       │
                       ▼
              PtcRunner.Sandbox
              (isolated BEAM process,
               1 s wall-clock, 10 MB heap)
                       │
                       ▼
              PtcRunner.Lisp.Eval
              (PTC-Lisp interpreter:
               Clojure subset + java.time +
               clojure.string, clojure.set,
               clojure.walk)

Each tools/call request flows top-to-bottom:

1. The transport frames one JSON-RPC message and hands it to the dispatcher. In stdio mode that is one NDJSON line; in HTTP mode it is one POST /mcp body scoped by MCP-Session-Id.
2. The dispatcher routes tools/call to a per-call worker after passing the concurrency semaphore (max_concurrent_calls, default 8). Excess calls return immediately with reason: "busy" instead of queuing.
3. The worker validates program / context / output_schema, builds fresh Lisp.run/2 opts (empty memory, empty tool cache, no journal reuse), and invokes PtcToolProtocol.lisp_run/2.
4. :ptc_runner runs the program in an isolated BEAM process with a 1 s wall-clock cap and a 10 MB heap cap (10 s / 100 MB in aggregator mode). Filesystem and network APIs are not exposed to the program; aggregator-mode programs reach out only through the mediated (tool/call …) builtin.
5. The result flows back up: PtcToolProtocol.render_success_from_step/2 builds the R22 success payload, or render_error/3 builds the R23 error payload. The MCP envelope (isError, structuredContent, content) wraps it. The transport writes one response frame back.

notifications/cancelled from the client kills the in-flight sandbox process. stdin EOF cancels every stdio in-flight call and exits cleanly; HTTP DELETE /mcp closes one protocol session and cancels its in-flight work.

Streamable HTTP

Start with --http to serve MCP over Streamable HTTP at /mcp (127.0.0.1:7332 by default). POST /mcp accepts one JSON-RPC message. GET /mcp returns 405 until SSE/resumability support is added. DELETE /mcp terminates the protocol session named by MCP-Session-Id.

HTTP mode is designed for private-network service deployment behind a TLS edge or load balancer. It requires a bearer token for non-loopback binds, validates browser Origin headers, exposes unauthenticated /health and /ready, and stamps request logs/telemetry/traces with hashed owner/session ids. See mcp-server-http-deployment.md.

Stateful Sessions

By default, lisp_eval is stateless: every call starts with empty Lisp memory and an empty tool cache. Starting the server with --sessions or PTC_RUNNER_MCP_SESSIONS=true adds explicit session tools:

• lisp_session_start
• lisp_session_eval
• lisp_session_inspect
• lisp_session_list
• lisp_session_forget
• lisp_session_close

Session evals persist explicit (def ...) and (defn ...) bindings, the last three successful eval results (*1, *2, *3), captured println output, and bounded/redacted tool-call history. let bindings and ordinary intermediate values do not persist. Use lisp_session_forget to remove stale or large bindings and clear bounded histories.

lisp_session_list returns metadata-only live sessions for the current owner. It does not render stored binding values or refresh session idle timers.

Sessions are in-memory, owner-scoped, disabled by default, TTL/idle bounded, and allow at most one eval in a given session at a time. lisp_session_eval uses the same global concurrency gate as lisp_eval; a second eval on the same session returns session_busy rather than queueing.

lisp_session_eval follows the same response-profile model as lisp_eval. In the default slim profile it returns text only and does not advertise outputSchema. In structured, it returns compact structuredContent with the result, session summary, and memory.changed_keys / stored_keys; it does not echo stored binding values. Full binding previews, upstream-call ledgers, and ptc_metrics are diagnostics and are available through lisp_debug or session inspection paths rather than normal slim/structured eval responses.

Security model

ptc_runner_mcp is a stdio MCP server. That has implications the operator must own; the package cannot enforce them.

Trust boundary

The server runs under the user's auth context — the same as every other stdio MCP server. Anyone with stdio access can submit arbitrary PTC-Lisp. The sandbox is the protection against that program; the operator is responsible for not exposing the server to untrusted callers.

What the sandbox protects against

• Filesystem reads / writes. PTC-Lisp has no slurp, no spit, no file I/O at all.
• Network access. No http-get, no socket primitives. The closed-world assumption is asserted by the openWorldHint: false tool annotation.
• Process exec. No shell-out, no :os.cmd, no port spawn.
• Resource exhaustion. Five distinct caps: max_frame_bytes (8 MB), max_program_bytes (64 KB), max_context_bytes (4 MB), max_concurrent_calls (8 by default), plus the per-program 1 s wall-clock and 10 MB memory limits. Crossing a cap returns a structured error result, not a server crash.
• Cross-call leakage. Each tools/call runs in a fresh BEAM process with empty user namespace, empty tool cache, and no journal reuse. Two sequential calls cannot see each other's (def …) bindings — asserted by an isolation regression test.

What the sandbox does NOT protect against

• A malicious operator with stdio access. The server trusts the bytes on its stdin. If an attacker controls the calling MCP client or the spawning process, no in-server check helps.
• The operator's own log files. If the operator runs the server with --log-level debug, program and context bodies land in stderr logs. That is intentional for debugging but means the operator owns that data's hygiene. Defaults are conservative: full payloads are debug-level only.
• Trace files. With --trace-dir set, per-call JSONL traces are written to disk. --trace-payloads summary (the default when tracing is on) records sizes and SHA-256 digests only; --trace-payloads full includes verbatim bytes. The choice is the operator's; the package does not exfiltrate.
• Side channels in the calling LLM. The server returns whatever the program returns. If the program is constructed to encode caller-supplied secrets in its result, those bytes flow back to the client. PtcRunner has nothing to say about what the calling LLM does with its inputs.

Operator log hygiene

Default log levels are conservative. info and above never include verbatim program or context. Traces are off unless --trace-dir is set. If you do enable tracing, prefer --trace-payloads summary unless you are actively debugging a specific reproduction.

Limits

Frame overflow surfaces as a JSON-RPC -32700. The other caps surface as structured tool-result errors (args_error, busy, timeout, memory_limit). Aggregator mode adds its own per-call caps (upstream_call_timeout_ms, max_upstream_response_bytes, max_upstream_calls_per_program); see docs/mcp-server-configuration.md for the full set.

Links

• mcp_server/README.md — install and client configuration.
• docs/mcp-server-configuration.md — every flag, environment variable, response profile, catalog mode, tracing setup, and lifecycle command.
• docs/aggregator-mode.md — calling configured upstream MCP servers from inside the sandbox via (tool/call …), plus the payload-reduction metrics emitted on every aggregator response.
• docs/agentic-mode.md — lisp_task, the natural-language planner tool layered on top of aggregator mode.
• docs/mcp-debug.md — the opt-in lisp_debug diagnostics tool.
• Getting started guide — short walkthrough from install to first schema-validated call.
• docs/ptc-lisp-specification.md — the PTC-Lisp language reference.
• docs/function-reference.md — every built-in function with its signature.
• docs/signature-syntax.md — internal PTC return-type grammar used behind output_schema validation.
• Model Context Protocol — the upstream protocol spec.