Changelog

Copy Markdown View Source

All notable changes to metamorphic_log are documented here. The format is based on Keep a Changelog, and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning.

[0.1.6]

Supply-chain bump propagating the upstream ML-DSA signing-stack hardening down to the primitives layer. No public API, wire-format, or behavioural changes — every proof, CONIKS, KEYTRANS, commitment, ingestion, and signing path is byte-for-byte identical to 0.1.5.

Changed

  • Bump the native metamorphic-log core dependency 0.1.9 → 0.1.10 and metamorphic-crypto 0.10.2 → 0.10.5, pulling in the shared native signing guard and the 8 MiB WASM shadow-stack linker bump at the source.
  • Dedupe the signing-stack guard. The locally open-coded on_signing_stack helper in the NIF is replaced by the shared, audited generic metamorphic_crypto::on_signing_stack, which the crypto core now exports (a 32 MiB scoped worker thread that joins and resumes any unwind). Behaviour is unchanged — the hybrid signing NIFs (nif_note_sign_hybrid, nif_checkpoint_sign_hybrid, nif_signed_policy_sign) still run ML-DSA off the dirty scheduler on an ample stack, so callers need no +sssdcpu tuning. #![forbid(unsafe_code)] is retained.
  • Bump the :test-only metamorphic_crypto Hex dependency ~> 0.8.1 → ~> 0.8.2 so the test suite (including the SIGBUS regression) resolves against the hardened NIF release.

[0.1.5]

Adds the signing (producer) surface to complement the existing verification APIs, so operators (checkpoint publishers, witnesses, policy authors) can produce C2SP artifacts server-side from a metamorphic-crypto composite key or a raw Ed25519 seed. Additive — no canonical byte-format changes; every existing verification, proof, CONIKS, KEYTRANS, commitment, and ingestion path is unchanged.

Added

  • MetamorphicLog.VerifierKey.encode_hybrid/2 and encode_ed25519/2 — derive the canonical C2SP vkey text (<name>+<hex(key_id)>+<base64(type_id || public_key)>) from a stored public key, ready to feed Checkpoint.verify/2 / Note.verify/2.

  • MetamorphicLog.Note.sign_hybrid/3 and sign_ed25519/3 — produce a signed note over an arbitrary body.

  • MetamorphicLog.Checkpoint.sign_hybrid/5 — sign an origin/size/root checkpoint head as a hybrid post-quantum signed note.

  • MetamorphicLog.Policy.sign/2 — sign a namespace policy (CONIKS or KEYTRANS directory axis) into the canonical SignedPolicy envelope, with atom→string enum validation ahead of the NIF boundary.

    ML-DSA signing is hedged (randomized): signature bytes are not reproducible, but the derived verifier key verifies deterministically.

Fixed

  • Dirty-scheduler stack overflow on hybrid signing. ML-DSA's hedged signing path allocates large intermediate lattice matrices on the stack, overflowing the BEAM dirty-CPU scheduler thread's default stack (+sssdcpu, ~320 KB) and crashing the VM with SIGBUS. The signing NIFs now run the core operation on a dedicated thread with an ample (32 MiB) stack and block the dirty scheduler on the join, so callers need no +sssdcpu tuning in vm.args. Ed25519 signing and all verification paths were unaffected.

Changed

  • Bumps the wrapped crate dependency metamorphic-log 0.1.6 -> 0.1.9 (adds the checkpoint::sign_checkpoint_hybrid convenience and the note/vkey/policy signing primitives consumed here). metamorphic-crypto stays at 0.10.2.
  • Bumps rustler 0.37 -> 0.38 and raises the NIF crate MSRV 1.85 -> 1.91 (required by metamorphic-crypto's toolchain). Adds metamorphic_crypto ~> 0.8.1 as a test-only dependency for producer↔verifier round-trips.

[0.1.4]

Supply-chain / dependency maintenance release. Bumps the wrapped crate dependencies metamorphic-log 0.1.5 -> 0.1.6 and metamorphic-crypto 0.10.0 -> 0.10.2, refreshing the NIF Cargo.lock to pull in the transitive cmov 0.5.3 -> 0.5.4 security fix (RustSec GHSA-3rjw-m598-pq24 / CVE-2026-50185, aarch64 Cmov/CmovEq correctness), aes-gcm 0.11.0 (rc -> stable), and anyhow 1.0.103 (RUSTSEC-2026-0190, build-tooling only). Dependency-only — no canonical byte-format changes; inclusion/consistency, key-history/v1, CONIKS, signed-note/checkpoint, commitment, policy-v1, KEYTRANS, and ingestion are all unchanged. Precompiled NIFs rebuilt for all targets.

[0.1.3]

Supply-chain currency bump. Bumps the wrapped crate dependencies metamorphic-log 0.1.4 -> 0.1.5 and metamorphic-crypto 0.9 -> 0.10 (published crates only; no [patch]/path deps). No canonical byte-format changes — inclusion/consistency, key-history/v1, CONIKS, signed-note/checkpoint, commitment, policy-v1, KEYTRANS, and ingestion are all unchanged. The wrapped metamorphic-crypto 0.10 is additive only (adds a standalone HKDF-SHA512 primitive that is unused here). p256 stays pinned at =0.14.0-rc.14.

[0.1.2]

Brings the NIF up to parity with the metamorphic-log Rust crate 0.1.4, adding the Slice 9 KEYTRANS (IETF combined-tree directory) verification surface and the namespace-policy directory axis. Bumps the wrapped crate dependencies metamorphic-log 0.1.3 -> 0.1.4 and metamorphic-crypto 0.8 -> 0.9 (published crates only; no [patch]/path deps). No canonical byte-format changes to any frozen layer — inclusion/consistency, key-history/v1, CONIKS, signed-note/checkpoint, commitment, policy-v1, and ingestion are all unchanged, and the CONIKS-route policy output is backward-compatible (new keys are additive).

Added

  • KEYTRANS verification (MetamorphicLog.Keytrans). Suite-aware, relying-party verification of the IETF KEYTRANS combined-tree directory (draft-ietf-keytrans-protocol-04), mirroring the browser WASM SDK's keytransVerify*Suite surface. Stateless — recomputes everything from public inputs (VRF public key, combined-tree root, label, proof).
    • verify_search/6 — greatest-version search (§6): the value at a label's most recent version, or absence.
    • verify_fixed_version/6 — fixed-version search (§7).
    • verify_monitor/6 — monitoring (§8): a downgrade is rejected.
    • suite_id/1 — the §15.1 suite_id for a suite atom.
    • The cipher suite is always explicit (no default): :kt128_sha256_p256 (0x0001), :kt128_sha256_ed25519 (0x0002) — the on-spec IETF standard suites (HMAC-SHA256 commitment) — and :metamorphic_hybrid_exp (0xF000), the private hybrid-PQ suite.
    • Movable / experimental: the proof wire is tagged KEYTRANS_EXP_04 and tracks the draft; it is deliberately not byte-frozen. The golden test vectors are kept out of the frozen cross-language KAT set.
  • Policy directory axis (MetamorphicLog.Policy).

    • Verified policies now expose :directory_mode (:coniks | :keytrans) and :keytrans_suite (:metamorphic_hybrid_exp | :kt128_sha256_p256 | :kt128_sha256_ed25519) alongside the existing posture fields (additive, backward-compatible; default to the CONIKS route).

    • enforce_directory_backend/2 — declared == observed for the directory backend, accepting a :coniks / :keytrans atom or a raw u16 id.

0.1.1

Brings the NIF up to parity with the metamorphic-log Rust crate 0.1.3, adding the Slice 8 anchoring / attestation surface (the crate's first post-v0.1 slice). No canonical byte-format changes to any audited layer; the existing verification, CONIKS, policy, and ingestion surfaces are unchanged. Bumps the wrapped crate dependency 0.1.2 -> 0.1.3.

Added

  • Backend-agnostic anchoring (MetamorphicLog.Anchor). Format + verification for committing a checkpoint's signed tree head to an external, hard-to-equivocate medium (chain, RFC 3161 notary, WORM storage, another log), byte-identical to the native core and WASM SDK. Deliberately I/O-free — the medium client, cadence, fees, and confirmation depth stay in the operator layer.
    • record_canonical_bytes/6 / parse_record/1 — the canonical, byte-locked AnchorRecord binding a checkpoint head (origin / size / root_hash) to an opaque locator and an agnostic medium tag, with a self-describing safe-menu commitment algorithm ("sha3_512" in v0.1).
    • anchor_commitment/1 — the fixed-size, medium-independent commitment an operator publishes to (and re-fetches from) the medium.
    • rfc6962_leaf_hash/1 — the record's Layer-0 leaf hash, so attestations may themselves be logged.
    • verify_anchored/4 — the log-side third-party audit that an attestation binds a checkpoint and that successive anchored heads are append-only consistent (RFC 9162), trusting neither operator nor medium.
    • verify_commitment/2 — the medium-side counterpart: bytes fetched from the medium equal the recomputed commitment. The Rust CommitmentSink trait and its I/O bridges are intentionally not wrapped — that backend belongs on the BEAM side.
  • Docs: HexDocs badge in the README and an Anchoring module group.

0.1.0

Initial release: the Elixir/Hex client for the metamorphic-log transparency-log engine, as a sibling package to metamorphic_crypto, built on precompiled Rust NIFs (Rustler + rustler_precompiled) wrapping the published metamorphic-log crate.

Added

  • Verification + monitor SDK, mirroring the browser WASM SDK surface:
  • Ingestion primitives (MetamorphicLog.Ingest) — content/token dedup keys, tile flush geometry, and Merkle recomputation over tile bytes for an Elixir operator pipeline. Sequencing state and tile I/O are intentionally left to the BEAM side.
  • CPU-bound NIFs (proof/VRF/signature verification, Merkle recomputation) run on dirty CPU schedulers; micro-operations run inline.
  • Cross-language byte-parity KAT (test/cross_language_kat_test.exs): the NIF reproduces the same locked vectors as the Rust core and WASM SDK (metamorphic-log/tests/cross_language.rs).