Wraps the api_key/private_key pair so it can sit in a GenServer's state without
printing in full the moment that process crashes.
The incident this closes
Rest.get_top_of_book/3 itself is stateless — Auth.headers/5's own moduledoc already
says "signs one request, and keeps nothing." But Feed keeps a copy of state.credentials
for its whole lifetime anyway: start_poller/1 closes over it to build the fetch
callback Core.PollingFeed calls on every tick, and a crash-restart (init/1 running
again from Feed's own supervisor) needs the original value to rebuild that closure,
since PollingFeed's own state does not survive its parent's crash. OTP's default
crash report prints a GenServer's state in full on termination, and a plain map
field prints every key including the raw Ed25519 seed — verified against a real crash
of an equivalent process holding %{api_key: "...", private_key: "..."} as a bare
state field.
A struct whose Inspect is derived with except: naming both fields closes this:
Kernel.inspect/1 — which both the crash-report formatter and a FunctionClauseError's
printed argument list go through — honours a struct's Inspect protocol even nested
inside an otherwise-plain state map. Wrapping once, in Feed.init/1, keeps
Rest.get_top_of_book/3 and Auth.headers/5 working unchanged: a struct is a map, and
Auth.decode_seed/1 reads credentials.private_key the same way whether the struct or
the original map is behind it.
The wrap lives in child_spec/1, so bypassing it bypasses the redaction
child_spec/1 is where wrap_opt/1 is applied, because a supervisor captures the
{module, :start_link, [opts]} MFA before start_link/1 or init/1 ever runs — see
wrap_opt/1's own doc. A consumer who uses the supported {DpExchange.X, credentials: ...} child form gets the redaction for free.
A consumer who builds the child spec themselves does not, and upgrading this package
will not change that: their supervisor stores the raw map and OTP renders it on the next
crash, with nothing from this package on that path to intervene. It is a real path with a
real reason — a caller needing a delivery target other than the supervisor has to reach
start_link/1 directly — so wrap/1 and wrap_opt/1 are public for it. Reported by
a consumer who went looking for their canary in supervisor state after upgrading and
found it; the natural assumption, "upgraded, therefore redacted", is wrong there.
The same applies to a host that reshapes a credential before handing it over — mapping its own key names into this venue's and returning a bare map re-introduces the leak downstream of anything this package can reach.
Summary
Functions
Wraps a raw credentials map for storage in process state.
Wraps the :credentials entry of an options keyword list, IN PLACE and only when that
key is actually present.
Types
Functions
Wraps a raw credentials map for storage in process state.
Any map is struct-ified with Kernel.struct/2, which ignores keys the struct does not
declare rather than raising — matching how Auth.headers/5 already reads this map, by
pattern-matching only the keys it needs.
Wraps the :credentials entry of an options keyword list, IN PLACE and only when that
key is actually present.
This is what keeps a raw secret out of a supervisor's stored child spec, and it has
to be applied in child_spec/1 — nowhere later is early enough. A supervisor holds the
{module, :start_link, [opts]} MFA it was handed, and OTP writes that argument list
through inspect/1 into the Start Call: line of the report it logs whenever the child
terminates. Wrapping inside start_link/1 or init/1 does nothing for it: by then the
raw list has already been captured by the supervisor above.
dp-exchange-core issue #29 — a consumer found live API keys in cleartext in ordinary application logs, produced by any child crash at all, and nearly pasted them into a GitHub issue while reporting a different bug.