Explicit entry point for the v3 wire profile (contract-major 3, the
BAP3-ES256-SHA256 suite).
The v3 profile is byte-distinct from v1 and v2: grant and proof payloads carry
v: 3, protected headers carry alg: "ES256", the proof key is the EC P-256
JWK, domain separators are BAP3-*, and signatures are the RFC 7518 §3.4 raw
r || s form with the low-S canonicality rule
(ADR 0035). Each major
verifies under its own complete closed profile; the v1 and v2 façades reject
v3 bytes and this façade rejects v1 and v2 bytes.
Summary
Functions
Assembles a validated signing input and raw ES256 signature at profile maxima.
Assembles a validated signing input and raw ES256 signature under caller bounds.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS boundary-anchor signing input.
Checks a raw nonempty consumption-chain range against mandatory caller boundaries.
Verifies a raw grant-and-proof envelope against server-derived expected context.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact grant without evaluating trust.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact proof without evaluating trust.
Frames an exact deterministic anchored export after semantic validation.
Encodes one exact canonical consumption-chain row.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS grant signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS historical-key-transition signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS holder-proof signing input.
Returns the canonical type-preserving request digest.
Parses only the protected grant header and returns its untrusted kid hint.
Atomically verifies one raw anchored export against caller boundaries and key history.
Verifies one raw compact grant against caller-supplied trust and expected context.
Verifies one raw compact boundary anchor against one exact historical public key.
Verifies one raw compact authenticated historical-key transition.
Functions
@spec assemble_compact(BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t(), binary()) :: {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}
Assembles a validated signing input and raw ES256 signature at profile maxima.
@spec assemble_compact( BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t(), binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map() ) :: {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}
Assembles a validated signing input and raw ES256 signature under caller bounds.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS boundary-anchor signing input.
Checks a raw nonempty consumption-chain range against mandatory caller boundaries.
Verifies a raw grant-and-proof envelope against server-derived expected context.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact grant without evaluating trust.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact proof without evaluating trust.
Frames an exact deterministic anchored export after semantic validation.
Encodes one exact canonical consumption-chain row.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS grant signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS historical-key-transition signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS holder-proof signing input.
Returns the canonical type-preserving request digest.
@spec untrusted_key_locator(binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()) :: {:ok, BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.KeyLocator.t()} | {:error, :invalid}
Parses only the protected grant header and returns its untrusted kid hint.
The complete compact input is bounded. Payload and signature segments are not decoded,
interpreted, or independently size-checked. The header walk pins this suite's alg.
Atomically verifies one raw anchored export against caller boundaries and key history.
Verifies one raw compact grant against caller-supplied trust and expected context.
Verifies one raw compact boundary anchor against one exact historical public key.
Verifies one raw compact authenticated historical-key transition.