Explicit entry point for the v2 wire profile (contract-major 2, the
BAP2-Ed25519-SHA256 suite).
The v2 profile is byte-distinct from v1: grant and proof payloads carry v: 2,
domain separators are BAP2-*, and the selector algebra admits the two
inclusive range kinds lte/gte (ADR 0028).
Each major verifies under its own complete closed profile; the v1 façade
rejects v2 bytes and this façade rejects v1 bytes.
Summary
Functions
Assembles a validated signing input and raw Ed25519 signature at profile maxima.
Assembles a validated signing input and raw Ed25519 signature under caller bounds.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS boundary-anchor signing input.
Checks a raw nonempty consumption-chain range against mandatory caller boundaries.
Verifies a raw grant-and-proof envelope against server-derived expected context.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact grant without evaluating trust.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact proof without evaluating trust.
Frames an exact deterministic anchored export after semantic validation.
Encodes one exact canonical consumption-chain row.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS grant signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS historical-key-transition signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS holder-proof signing input.
Returns the canonical type-preserving request digest.
Parses only the protected grant header and returns its untrusted kid hint.
Atomically verifies one raw anchored export against caller boundaries and key history.
Verifies one raw compact grant against caller-supplied trust and expected context.
Verifies one raw compact boundary anchor against one exact historical public key.
Verifies one raw compact authenticated historical-key transition.
Functions
@spec assemble_compact(BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t(), binary()) :: {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}
Assembles a validated signing input and raw Ed25519 signature at profile maxima.
@spec assemble_compact( BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t(), binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map() ) :: {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}
Assembles a validated signing input and raw Ed25519 signature under caller bounds.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS boundary-anchor signing input.
Checks a raw nonempty consumption-chain range against mandatory caller boundaries.
Verifies a raw grant-and-proof envelope against server-derived expected context.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact grant without evaluating trust.
Boundedly decodes a raw compact proof without evaluating trust.
Frames an exact deterministic anchored export after semantic validation.
Encodes one exact canonical consumption-chain row.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS grant signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS historical-key-transition signing input.
Builds the deterministic standard-JWS holder-proof signing input.
Returns the canonical type-preserving request digest.
@spec untrusted_key_locator(binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()) :: {:ok, BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.KeyLocator.t()} | {:error, :invalid}
Parses only the protected grant header and returns its untrusted kid hint.
The complete compact input is bounded. Payload and signature segments are not decoded,
interpreted, or independently size-checked. The header walk is major-neutral (it inspects
alg/typ/kid only), so it delegates to the shared v1 implementation.
Atomically verifies one raw anchored export against caller boundaries and key history.
Verifies one raw compact grant against caller-supplied trust and expected context.
Verifies one raw compact boundary anchor against one exact historical public key.
Verifies one raw compact authenticated historical-key transition.