HTTP traffic enters the approved AttestoMCP.Plug.ProtectResource boundary
before body decoding and protocol dispatch; its prepared dynamic authorization
API receives route-derived scopes. Configure a trusted static or
runtime-resolved resource origin behind TLS-terminating proxies,
an Attesto issuer, sender constraints, replay/nonce checks, and least-privilege
scopes. Do not put credentials, proofs, request state, or private content in
logs or telemetry. Hosts using definition-scoped grants may explicitly set the
Plug scope_policy for the supported catalog and selected tool/resource
methods. Selected definitions are resolved before retry-state consumption and
authorized through the prepared boundary; denied and unknown definitions have
the same neutral protocol result. Omit this option to retain generic method
scopes, and never overlap it with scope_map (including an empty entry).
Modern subscriptions use configured default_scopes instead of generic
category scopes when no non-empty scope_map["subscriptions/listen"] entry
exists. A non-empty method entry is additive to generic category scopes, and
subscription_scopes are always additive. Modern delivery rechecks that
opening union plus notification requirements; resource updates also require the
generic resource scope and any matched definition scopes. Legacy
subscription-notification delivery reauthorizes catalog events with their
generic category scope; resource-update notifications also require any matched
definition scopes. If a Phoenix endpoint parses bodies before the router,
install the exact-path parser bypass or enforce an equally strict parser limit
before relying on the Plug's authenticate-before-decode guarantee.
Definitions with empty required scopes are authenticated-only only under
explicit definition policy; defaults and empty map entries retain generic scope
checks. Report security issues privately to the maintainers.
alternative_scope_sets is an OR of complete all-of clauses, not a list of
independent scopes. Keep each alternative least-privilege and review broader
administrative clauses deliberately. The server applies the same bounded
clauses to catalogs, selected lookups, templates, subscriptions, and both
protocol eras, then runs a definition's authorize callback once after one
clause succeeds. Alternatives never weaken token validation, sender binding,
revocation, principal loading, or request reauthentication.
Set scopes_supported per MCP mount when the authorization server issues
custom grants. Advertising generic package scopes for a custom-scope resource
can make discovery-driven clients request an unusable grant. When
AttestoPhoenix owns a reused metadata route, its protected-resource
configuration is authoritative.
A resolver-backed :auth may provide its absolute canonical resource or base
origin at runtime. Treat that callback and its configuration source as part of
the security boundary. The server requires exact agreement with the mounted
path and any static resource/origin value, and uses the same resolved identifier
for metadata and audience verification. Do not use allow_dynamic_origin in
production or derive an audience from an untrusted Host header.
The server-wide max_json_bytes budget defaults to 2,000,000 bytes and accepts
values from 512 through 64,000,000 bytes. The minimum leaves room for a bounded
protocol error. HTTP max_body_bytes and max_message_bytes must be positive;
stdio max_message_bytes must be at least 512 bytes. None may exceed the
supervised server's selected budget. The message limit still governs JSON-RPC
decoding. Raising the budget increases peak allocation and
response-amplification exposure; set only the smallest value required. Keep an
upstream parser's limit at least as strict as the MCP Plug and preserve the
authenticate-before-body-read ordering.
Every successful result is bounded again after protocol, cache, and server identity fields are added. This final check applies to modern and legacy responses, including aggregate catalog pages and completion values; a result that no longer fits is replaced with a bounded internal protocol error.
An HTTP context_builder receives the authenticated connection and may return
application data for handlers. The returned map is available only at
context.host_context; it cannot replace authenticated identity, grants, or
Attesto assigns. A non-map return or callback failure stops dispatch and emits
only a generic client response. Use AttestoMCP.Server.Result.error/2 only for
bounded failure text and codes intentionally safe to disclose.
Content and result constructors validate protocol data; they do not decide
whether data is safe to disclose. Keep secrets and untrusted diagnostic detail
out of text, resources, annotations, and _meta. Binary constructors accept an
already encoded canonical padded-Base64 value, so hosts remain responsible for
content classification and media-type policy. JSON Schema defaults are never
inserted by dispatch. The opt-in property-default helper is bounded and
revalidates its result, but defaults remain host-authored input and must not
carry authority or bypass authorization checks.
External legacy-session adapters are part of the security boundary. They must
implement atomic update and expiry callbacks, preserve unknown record fields,
keep {namespace, session_id} as data rather than atoms, and enforce access
controls appropriate to their backend. Cluster mode requires a shared adapter
and explicit namespace. In 0.12.0, peer catalog drift cannot reduce
publisher-required scopes; drain mixed old/new clusters rather than rely on
them for resource notifications. Stream processes are node-local and must
reconnect after failover; never treat a session identifier as authorization.
replace_catalog/2 atomically swaps the in-memory definition catalog, but the
host remains responsible for the trusted source of those definitions. Validate
that a generated replacement contains every intended authorization clause and
handler before applying it; omitted definitions are removed. Failed and no-op
replacements do not advance the revision or emit catalog invalidations.