Changelog

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All notable changes to this project are documented in this file.

The format is based on Keep a Changelog.

Unreleased

2.0.2 — October 6, 2026

Fixed

  • Outbound Retry-After is honored on every retryable status, not only 408/429: a 5xx response carrying the header (the canonical 503 overload signal) now schedules the receiver's own recovery window; an absent or malformed header keeps the backoff fallback (first reported by a sirtify consumer review). Note the bound this moves: a header-bearing 5xx snooze is clamped by retry_after_cap_seconds (default 86,400s), not max_backoff_seconds (default 3,600s) — an exhaust-fast adopter that lowered the latter but left the cap at its default will hold a 503-with-header attempt up to 24x longer per attempt. Lower retry_after_cap_seconds if that posture must hold.
  • Test dependency currency: ash_postgres 2.14.2 → 2.14.3.

2.0.1 — October 6, 2026

The first published 2.x release includes the delivery ownership, recovery, and migration changes below. The guided tour keeps protocol implementations available for resources defined during notebook evaluation.

Fixed

  • Disable protocol consolidation in the Livebook setup so dynamically defined Ash resources use their custom display without consolidation warnings.
  • Update the notebook, release tooling, and production consumer to 2.0.1.

2.0.0 — October 6, 2026

Source candidate; superseded by 2.0.1 before Hex publication. The Git tag is retained.

Delivery rows now retain declaration and queue ownership, fence each send attempt, and recover unfinished work after queue exhaustion or an interrupted endpoint disable. HubSpot retries use a stable batch identity, and the default transport bounds the complete HTTP operation. Existing installations require the ordered schema and identity migration in UPGRADING.md before running 2.0 workers or ingress.

Changed

  • Outbound rows persist declaration ownership and queue route. A declaration cannot recover another declaration's rows. Named callbacks have stable routes; anonymous callbacks can supply enqueue_key for durable recovery.
  • Send and recovery admission use separate UUID tokens and expiring leases. Every result is fenced to the live attempt; retry ceilings are checked before sending. The complete ledger primary key is used throughout.
  • A 410 response records :disable_pending before disabling the matching endpoint configuration. Recovery completes that obligation without another HTTP request.
  • Oban uniqueness covers runnable jobs and the durable route/tenant identity. Completed or discarded jobs do not strand recoverable rows; an unpersisted conflict is an admission error.
  • HubSpot's default dedup identity canonicalizes the complete batch, ignoring only each outer event's attemptNumber. The optional provider event_identity/1 callback follows an explicit declaration extractor in precedence. Retained legacy rows are adopted explicitly, preserving payloads and an audit map.
  • Ash's supported floor is 3.34.3, including its security correction and the tenant inverse API used by workers. The lock resolves Ash 3.34.4, AshPostgres 2.14.2, and Spark 2.7.6.

Fixed

  • Minimal production consumers start :public_key and :ssl through the package's application dependencies; optional packages are unnecessary for default HTTPS.
  • Direct delivery calls apply the documented retry defaults for omitted or nil settings, including the attempt ceiling and bounded Retry-After, without requiring an Oban worker.
  • Required keyset pagination, bounded retention deletion, custom ledger keys, renamed UUID endpoint/subscription keys, and aliased worker HTTP-option resolvers.
  • Endpoint status values are cast and constrained at compile time; empty enabled sets, overlapping states, and primary-key mappings are rejected.
  • IDs on direct event structs and HTTP headers reject control bytes and malformed UTF-8. Telemetry reasons use a fixed vocabulary, preventing arbitrary tokens from escaping.
  • SSRF classification covers special-purpose address ranges; IPv6 Host values are bracketed. Bounded HTTP follows interim responses to the final response, stops at its body cap, and uses one deadline across resolution and transport.
  • HubSpot's finite event taxonomy includes generic object events.

Documentation and delivery

  • Current install/version pins, terminal inbound acknowledgments, generated DSL references, migration instructions, and an executable 2.0.0 Livebook.
  • Candidate archive inspection and notebook execution precede publication; the normal notebook then executes against the exact published version.
  • Documentation changes trigger Linux CI. The minimum-consumer leg pins Ash 3.34.3; package, PostgreSQL, coverage, and Livebook checks feed all-checks-pass.

1.3.0 — October 5, 2026

Additive options for domain naming and lifecycle, a compile fix for generated (non-writable) primary keys, typed subscription matching, loud documentation of the policy/id/adapter obligations, and a Linux CI leg exercising an AshPostgres uuid_v7 consumer shape.

Added (additive options — non-breaking per ADR-0010)

  • payload_attribute on the outbound_delivery section. The exact payload-bytes column's name is configurable (default :payload): rename it when the consumer's domain reserves payload for its own sole payload store. The injected column, the :dispatch accept list, and every signing/sending read follow the configured name; a name colliding with another injected field fails closed at compile.
  • prune_action :none on the outbound_delivery section. Opt out of the retention destroy :prune action's injection for append-only audit ledgers (no destroy action exists on the resource at all); AshHooks.Delivery.prune/2 then fails loud with a named error — deletion is the consumer's own surface. Default :destroy is unchanged.
  • status_attribute / enabled_values / disabled_value on the new endpoint section. Map the durable enable/disable onto the consumer's OWN switch (e.g. an active boolean): status is then not injected — one switch, so the consumer's off switch and the package's can never silently disagree. The dispatcher's skip and the send path's dead-letter both route through AshHooks.Endpoint.enabled?/1; the 410 auto-disable flips the mapped attribute. The mapped attribute must be consumer-declared (fail-closed at compile).
  • A Linux CI leg with a Postgres service exercising the transformers against an AshPostgres, uuid_v7-keyed, sole-store-payload consumer shape (postgres job; the suite is env-gated by ASH_HOOKS_POSTGRES=1 and excluded from ordinary dev runs). ash_postgres is a dev/test-only dependency — never ships, never constrains consumers.

Fixed

  • :dispatch/:ingest no longer accept :id on resources whose primary key is a non-writable :id (e.g. uuid_v7_primary_key): Ash's ValidateAccept raised at compile on exactly that consumer shape, making the extensions unadoptable without replacing the PK. The accept lists carry :id only when the PK is a writable :id (the package-injected default — byte-identical classification); the transformer's decision is persisted and the runtimes read it back, so the compiled action and the classification path can never disagree (composite and non-:id primary keys included). For the non-writable shape, created/duplicate classification pre-reads the unique identity instead: exact in every sequential case (provider redeliveries, producer re-fires) and wherever the primary read can see the existing row (a base-filtered read that hides it classifies :created). Under a misclassification the storage upsert preserves one row. A double send stays impossible through the mark_sending CAS and inbound claim fence. Correction in 2.0.0: the 1.3 outbound state transition did not fence every late result or expired owner. Version 2.0 adds attempt tokens, leases, and separate enqueue claims; network sends remain at-least-once and require receiver deduplication. In 1.3 the enqueue seam was the configured enqueuer's own fence — the default Oban enqueuer's endpoint_id+event_uuid job uniqueness, or the consumer's own dedup for a custom enqueue:. ADR-0010 note: the injected action accept lists are covered surface — this is a behavior correction (the previous accept list required a writable PK that consumers with generated PKs cannot provide), not a removal; no working consumer can regress (the shape did not compile).
  • Covered-surface tightening alongside the H4 mapping: the send path dead-letters an endpoint whose status is anything other than :enabled (previously only an exact :disabled dead-lettered, so a consumer-redeclared status with extra values delivered). The dispatcher's skip and the send path now route through the ONE AshHooks.Endpoint.enabled?/1 check — fail-closed by design.
  • AshHooks.Subscription.matches?/2 normalizes event_types entries with to_string/1. An atom-typed register ({:array, :atom} — a closed enum) previously matched NOTHING: zero deliveries, no error. Atom and string entries (and the "*"/:"*" wildcard in either representation) now match identically. Consumers redeclaring event_types keep their own constraints — the injected ["*"] default is not forced on them.

Changed

  • CI is Linux-only; the macOS and Windows build legs are removed. Tri-OS stays a developer-portability requirement (clone, set up, and test must work on every OS) — it was never meant to be a CI topology, and the README no longer claims dedicated per-OS legs. Also hygiene: the workflow's pinned GitHub Actions (checkout, cache, upload-artifact) moved off the Node 20 runtime to their current releases. No library code changed.
  • The DSL cheat-sheet drift gate is no longer vacuous. The package leg's mix spark.cheat_sheets --check ran without an extension list and checked nothing; it now passes the five extensions explicitly, so a stale documentation/dsls/ actually fails the build (the sheets in this release are regenerated under that invocation).
  • Dev/test mint bumped 1.10.1 → 1.11.0 (EEF-CVE-2026-94194 / -91043 / -92103, via the dev-only igniter→req→finch tree; never ships in the package). ash_postgres 2.13.1 is added dev/test-only for the Postgres leg above.

Docs

  • Policy obligation at the extension site (OutboundDelivery, Endpoint moduledocs): the injected write actions are named and the consumer-owned policy obligation is stated loudly — the inbound half's "you write your own" posture, mirrored outbound. The seven delivery actions plus the endpoint's :disable.
  • Deterministic Event.id guidance (Event, Dispatcher moduledocs): derive the id from the artifact's stable id — a generated id turns every producer re-fire into a duplicate POST per sweep.
  • The adapter-author contract (AshHooks.Http moduledoc): headers must be a LIST of {name, value} tuples (a map silently loses Retry-After), and the resolve-once/connect-pinned obligation that closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU is the adapter's, with the driver's send-time check as the residual.
  • retry_after_cap_seconds semantics (Worker moduledoc): the 86,400 default is receiver-held-state budget — up to 24 hours per attempt on one header; lower it for an exhaust-fast posture.
  • The 410 auto-disable posture (Delivery moduledoc): an unattributed system bulk write by design (no actor in a versioned register), no built-in tenant-facing signal — a receiver that answers 410 once goes dark silently unless the app wires the [:ash_hooks, :delivery, :disable] telemetry event or accepts the posture in writing.

1.2.1 — September 24, 2026

Fixed

  • The documentation tree now ships in the hex tarball. 1.2.0's package carried only the top-level docs (README, CHANGELOG, UPGRADING, usage-rules), so documentation/ — including the multi-tenant adoption checklist — was reachable only on GitHub/hexdocs while UPGRADING.md and the CHANGELOG referenced it by repo-relative path. Installed-package readers now get the tutorials (get-started, tenancy-adoption-checklist), the DSL reference, and the Livebook alongside those references. No library code changed; hexdocs and the package page README are unaffected.

1.2.0 — September 24, 2026

Tenancy release (ADR-0011, additive and opt-in): ash_hooks aligns with Ash attribute multitenancy — an explicit tenant threads every data call, and the package fails closed with named errors before any data access when a multitenant resource is touched without one. Single-tenant adopters change nothing: the entire pre-1.2 suite passes unchanged over tenant-less fixtures inside the now-610-test gate, because threading a tenant through resources with no multitenancy declaration is mechanically inert.

Added

  • Tenant threading on every path — AshHooks.dispatch/4 (:tenant opt), AshHooks.Ingress.ingest/4 (ctx[:tenant]), the claim/mark/ renew/redact/prune/reap heads (:tenant opt, new optional arity), AshHooks.Delivery.run/2 (tenant recovered from job args), and both prunes. The tenancy contract: consumers declare multitenancy :attribute, attribute: <same attr> on the resources a given operation touches; the package verifies that set on every entry point and returns {:error, :tenant_required} / {:error, :tenancy_mismatch} before any data access (Ash's native fail-closed stays the backstop; global?: true is rejected — it silently disables fail-closed reads). A compile-time verifier additionally rejects multitenancy :bypass, :bypass_all, and :allow_global actions on multitenant package resources.
  • Per-tenant operations — AshHooks.reap_all/2 and AshHooks.prune_all/2 sweep a tenant enumerable sequentially with per-tenant error isolation and totals ({:ok, %{results: %{tenant => {:ok, n} | {:error, reason}}, total: n}}).
  • AshHooks.reconcile_pending/3 — the supported reconciliation for delivery rows stranded at :pending by a crash between row write and enqueue: a WHERE-gated CAS flip to :enqueue_failed (real state change — matched-records is the win signal; exactly one winner per row among concurrent reconcilers, proven under a custom non-Oban seam), then enqueue through the same seam dispatch takes. Exactly-once ACROSS claim mechanisms (reconciliation vs re-dispatch repair) is the enqueue seam's contract — the canonical Oban seam's job uniqueness provides it; a custom seam must be idempotent itself.
  • Tenant-aware secret resolution (all optional) — the worker macro's :tenant_aware_secrets (2-arity f(ref, tenant) resolver contract); the inbound secret fn tenant -> ... end source; the provider behavior's optional webhook_signing_secret/2 (Organization × connection custody; use AshHooks.Provider ships an overridable default delegating to /1); and :tenant in the verify_signature/3 context map.
  • Oban args carry the tenant — the generated enqueue/2 serializes the row's tenant (string tenants are the supported shape; non-string tenants must round-trip parse_attribute over JSON); uniqueness keys stay [:endpoint_id, :event_uuid], and a pre-tenancy tenant-less job still conflicts with the tenant-bearing job on the same pair (proven on the real Oban engine).
  • The dispatch result contract is now a public typespec (AshHooks.Dispatcher.dispatch_result/0) including the new :reconciled status.
  • The multi-tenant adoption checklist (documentation/tutorials/tenancy-adoption-checklist.md) and ADR-0011.

Migration notes

Two adopter classes see action; single-tenant staying single-tenant sees none. See UPGRADING.md and the adoption checklist: (1) cutover with in-flight 1.1.x Oban jobs — drain before serving multitenant dispatch (pre-tenancy args fail closed, correct but noisy); (2) single→multi on populated tables — backfill the tenant attribute first (NULL-tenant rows form a shadow partition that strands effect-once), then regenerate identity indexes, then enable.

1.1.1 — September 16, 2026

Tri-OS proof release. No covered-surface change (patch, ADR-0010): the package now carries mechanical proof of macOS, Linux, and Windows support — a dedicated CI leg per OS runs the full 555-test suite on the dev-default toolchain, all nine legs green, and the README claims exactly the OSes the legs prove.

Added

  • CI legs on macOS and Windows (dev-default toolchain Elixir 1.20.4 / OTP 28, compile --warnings-as-errors + the full suite). Linux was already proven by every existing leg.
  • .gitattributes (* text=auto eol=lf): every OS checks out byte-identical sources; all tracked files were already LF, so no renormalization was needed.

Fixed

  • Four test-side portability defects exposed by the first Windows run (the package and its sqlite NIF substrate compiled and ran on Windows throughout — every defect was in fixtures):
    • two :inets httpd fixtures hardcoded server_root: "/tmp", nonexistent on Windows — one failure hid as a setup_all invalidation that silently excludes a whole module's tests from the failed count; both now use System.tmp_dir!();
    • CRLF checkout on Windows broke the install-task fixture's byte assertions (=~ "plug Plug.Parsers\n" vs "\r\n" bytes);
    • httpd's URL→path translation mangles backslashes, so every request returned 500 on Windows — the fixtures now hand httpd forward-slash server_root/document_root (a no-op on unix).

1.1.0 — September 16, 2026

Support-window release: the Elixir floor rises to 1.20 (a minor, not a major, by ADR-0010 rule 4 — the first exercise of that rule), the repo's own toolchain becomes self-enforcing and lockstep-pinned, and dependencies sit at latest with mix hex.audit running in CI.

Changed

  • The supported Elixir window is now ~> 1.20 (was ~> 1.17) — nothing below Elixir 1.20 is supported, by owner decision; the OTP floor is 28 (CI tests 28 and 29). Consumers on 1.17–1.19 get a resolver-level refusal instead of a compile. ADR-0010 rule 4 makes a supported-floor bump a MINOR release, so a ~> 1.0 pin resolves 1.1.0 and then fails resolution on old Elixirs — pin {:ash_hooks, "~> 1.0.4"} until you can move (see UPGRADING.md). CI tests the window on Erlang/OTP 28 (the dev default, pinned in .tool-versions and mirrored by a dedicated leg) and 29; the floor leg drops the lock and resolves at the floor to keep the requirement honest.
  • Repo-local toolchain enforcement — consumers are unaffected: config/ is excluded from the hex tarball. Development runs on one pinned toolchain (.tool-versions: Elixir 1.20.4 / Erlang/OTP 28) mirrored by a dedicated CI leg; config/config.exs refuses any OTP release CI does not test (currently 28/29) before anything compiles, because System.version/0 does not encode the OTP build and a same-Elixir foreign build would otherwise compile incompatible BEAMs silently. The window, .tool-versions, the OTP allowlist, and the CI matrix move together in ONE commit. mix hex.audit now runs in CI on every push.
  • Dependencies moved to latest (mix hex.outdated shows zero "Update possible"): oban 2.23.1 → 2.24.1, dialyxir 1.4.7 → 1.4.8, ex_doc 0.40.3 → 0.40.4. mix hex.audit clean before and after (and OSV shows no advisories against the three new versions).

Fixed

  • A %Regex{} inside a module attribute (@redaction_patterns) embeds the compiled re_pattern, which is a reference on OTP 28 — Elixir < 1.19 cannot escape references when injecting an attribute into a function body, so the package did not compile for consumers on 1.17–1.19 × OTP 28 (a combination the old window admitted). The patterns are now built by a defp (identical regexes, flags, and order); with the floor now at 1.20 that combination is out-of-window, and the defp keeps the escape class dead if the floor ever drops below 1.19.
  • mix dialyzer on a fresh PLT no longer reports 13 unknown-function/ unknown-type warnings in test/support: use AshSqlite.Repo emits Ecto.Adapters.SQL delegations, and the deps-PLT app enumeration does not reliably include :ecto_sql — it is now explicit in plt_add_apps with the reason inline.

Added

  • scripts/check-currency.sh: exits nonzero whenever mix hex.outdated shows resolvable drift, and prints the packages whose latest release the resolver will not take under current requirements — each of those must carry an inline deliberate-pin reason in mix.exs. Fail-closed: an errored hex.outdated run (lock mismatch, resolver failure) also exits nonzero.

1.0.4 — September 16, 2026

Current-Ash compatibility release: the repo's own app surfaces carry Ash 3.33's required default_string_length_count, and the byte-bound correction family that requirement exposed is fixed.

Fixed

  • Delta-review completions of the byte-bound invariant, each red-proven:
    • Event.new/1 and the dispatcher's event guards bound ids/types by BYTES, not String.length (graphemes) — under Ash 3.33 :codepoints, a 128-grapheme combining-character type (512 bytes) passed validation and then failed every endpoint's :dispatch create. The inbound side already bounded bytes; outbound now matches, in either counting mode.
    • A thrown 255-character token no longer overflows last_error: "throw: " <> classify_token(...) could reach 262 bytes and fail the enqueue-failure ledger write itself (mode-independent, ASCII); the combined string is capped now, like the :exit sibling.
    • An inbound handler failing with an invalid-UTF-8 binary no longer loses its failure record: the error class collapses to the redaction floor's [binary] placeholder instead of failing the :mark_failed write and leaving the delivery re-drivable.
  • Captured snippets and error summaries are now capped in BYTES instead of grapheme-sliced. Under Ash 3.33's :codepoints counting the injected max_length constraints count codepoints, and a grapheme-sliced 2048-character snippet of combining characters spans 4000+ codepoints — the post-send ledger write then violated its own constraint and crashed (mark_succeeded failed on a hostile response body), the same re-send poison class the control-byte strip closes. The byte cap (on a codepoint boundary) bounds the value under every counting mode, on every supported Ash. Covers the response-snippet capture path, the redaction floor, and the inbound error_class / dispatcher exit-string bounds. Found by mining a timed-out cross-vendor review probe; regression is red-proven against the grapheme-sliced code.
  • Current-Ash compatibility: Ash 3.33 requires every application that compiles resources to set config :ash, :default_string_length_count (the app-level half of GHSA-cwjv-574p-59f6), which broke the CI floor and Livebook legs — both resolve Ash lock-free at latest and failed resource compilation. The test application (config/test.exs, repo-local and never shipped), the get-started Livebook, and the tutorial now carry the setting. The package itself still writes no :ash configuration — consumers keep that choice, and both documented values work (see UPGRADING.md). A new tripwire test locks the boundary: lib/ never writes :ash application environment.
  • The tutorial's requirements line now matches the tested floor (Elixir ~> 1.17; the ~> 1.15 claim was disproven by the CI floor leg, per ADR-0010).

Changed

  • mix.lock: ash 3.33.4, and the dev/test substrate cleared of its published advisories (ash_sqlite 0.2.19 / ash_sql 0.7.5 — test-only, never shipped in the package; mix hex.audit now clean).

1.0.3 — August 23, 2026

Docs-and-tests release (no functional changes; 1.0.2's gate and fixes unchanged):

Changed

  • The send-failure contract tests dropped their 512MB bodies for 16MB with the peer's receive window pinned to 1KB — the same in-flight guarantee at 1/32nd the allocation, closing the resource-pressure residual from the 1.0.2 ship report. CI uploads the cover HTML when the coverage gate reds (triage data, not guesswork).

Docs

  • UPGRADING carries the 1.0.2 behavior notes (the :httpc literal-IP HTTPS refusal, the :http_opts threading).
  • The :httpc and Bounded moduledocs document the literal-IP posture and the :cacerts trust-store seam; ADR-0009 records the seam decision (wayfinder D3) in Consequences.

1.0.2 — August 22, 2026

The 100% coverage release: the maintainership directive (2026-08-22) superseding 1.0.1's print-only posture, worked through the wayfinder decisions (#20-#22) — line coverage of lib/ now GATES in CI, and the release carries the surfaces that build required.

Added

  • Target.ssl_options/2 and both HTTP adapters accept an injectable :cacerts trust bundle ([cacerts: der_list] in the adapter opts — on the Oban path, use AshHooks.Worker, http_opts: ...): pin a private CA for private-CA endpoints. Default UNCHANGED (the OTP CA store). The worker's http_opts takes compile-time literals, or an {m, f, a} resolved per-perform for computed bundles.
  • TLS success paths are covered by REAL CA-verified loopback sessions against committed local fixtures, including the literal-IP iPAddress-SAN floor and its fail-closed mismatch.

Fixed

  • AshHooks.Http.CertSan.ip_san_match?/2 fails closed (returns false) instead of CRASHING its caller when a certificate's SAN extension carries non-DER bytes: asn1's decode EXITS on invalid tags, which the previous error-only rescue could not catch.
  • AshHooks.Http.Httpc (the alternate adapter) refuses literal-IP HTTPS destinations with {:error, :ip_literal_https_needs_bounded}: it never holds the socket, so the iPAddress-SAN floor cannot run there and chain-validation alone would let any chain-valid certificate authenticate the endpoint IP. Use AshHooks.Http.Bounded (the default) for literal-IP HTTPS endpoints. Cross-vendor-reviewed (both peers), pre-existing hazard class.
  • use AshHooks.Worker threads :http_opts into the delivery config (the option was previously accepted and silently dropped).

Changed

  • mix test --cover GATES at 100% line coverage of lib/'s runtime-reachable lines (CI fails on a miss). The ignore list carries exactly the :cover-invisible classes: Spark's generated DSL sections, test-support modules, and four compile-window module-body lines. 31 provably-dead defensive arms were DELETED with proofs (commit d6f3788) rather than exempted; the shipped surface behaves identically.

1.0.1 — August 22, 2026

Docs-and-tests release (no functional changes). The 1.0.0 ship report's three residual postures are probed and pinned instead of documented:

Added

  • The fenced ledger's exactly-once claim is now pinned by a TRUE concurrent race test (8 simultaneous same-key ingests on a 3-connection sqlite pool: exactly one :created, one row) — and the same race without the storage unique index proves the failure mode: sqlite fails CLOSED with a loud storage error, zero rows. The InboundDelivery moduledoc cites both.
  • The :httpc adapter's giant-non-2xx window is now MEASURED (dribble probe: ~4.65MB transient for a 4MB error body against a 16-byte bound) with a committed containment test pinning the final cut; ADR-0009 carries the numbers.

Fixed

  • The missing-index hazard is documented accurately: on storage layers with native conflict support (sqlite, postgres) a missing unique index errors the ingest loudly — the previously documented "two rows, both :created" shape applies to degraded-upsert layers. The as-built floor is stronger than the docs claimed.

1.0.0 — August 22, 2026

1.0.0 is the semantic-versioning baseline (ADR-0010): no public API removals or renames from 0.2.x. Three behavior corrections below; migration notes in UPGRADING.md.

Fixed

  • Truncated chunked responses no longer classify as success. The default HTTP adapter returned a partial body as {:ok, ...} when a chunked response was cut by early close — a 2xx on partial bytes could mark a delivery :succeeded. Chunked now returns {:error, :truncated_body} exactly like the Content-Length framing, and the driver retries.
  • The literal-IP https certificate check actually works now. The iPAddress-SAN matcher was unreachable since birth (found by the new dialyzer gate): every literal-IP https endpoint was rejected fail-closed with :cert_ip_mismatch. Extracted to the fixture-tested AshHooks.Http.CertSan (ADR-0009). The IPv6 direction initially matched nothing (a cross-vendor review finding, fixed before release) — both address families now verify against fixture certificates.
  • A hostile chunked response can no longer balloon worker memory. The chunk consumer accumulated the ENTIRE attacker-declared chunk before trimming to the body bound — an 8MB declaration held ~16.8MB in the worker against a 16-byte bound (cross-vendor security review, executable probe). Consumption is now phase-bounded: keep at most the allowance, discard the excess slice-wise (one receive slice held at a time), and a chunk terminator that is not CRLF is now {:error, :malformed_chunked} instead of being silently consumed (a malformed 2xx can no longer classify as succeeded). Run-on chunk-size lines without a terminator are refused past a sane bound instead of being buffered.
  • AshHooks.Delivery.prune/2 returns {:error, error} when the resource lacks inserted_at — the same contract as AshHooks.Ingress.prune/2 its @spec always promised (previously raised ArgumentError).

Added

  • Semver and support policy (ADR-0010): the covered public surface is named, deprecations run two minors, and the minimum supported versions are CI-tested (Elixir ~> 1.17 / OTP 27+ / Ash ~> 3.0 / Oban ~> 2.20 optional). The previously claimed Elixir 1.15 floor was never buildable with current Ash and is corrected here — 1.0.0 is the first release whose floor is actually tested.
  • SECURITY.md with a private disclosure channel (GitHub private vulnerability reporting, enabled), scope, and known posture notes; CONTRIBUTING.md and UPGRADING.md — all three ship in the tarball and render on hexdocs.
  • Dialyzer gate on the public API (local + CI) — first run caught the dead IP-SAN matcher above.
  • CI: a floor leg resolving dependencies at the declared minimums (it disproved the old 1.15 claim on its first run), a package leg checking the hex tarball ships every documentation file and that the DSL cheat sheets match the DSL, and an advisory coverage report.
  • @spec on the HTTP behavior's request/5 (both adapters), AshHooks.dispatch/4, the resource extensions' statuses/0/signing_modes/0 (now documented), and the internal HTTP target-resolution helpers.
  • A dedicated extension-shape test suite for AshHooks.OutboundDelivery, pinning the injected attributes, the unique_delivery identity, and the :dispatch no-touch-upsert contract.

Changed

  • Read posture documented honestly (ADR-0005 amendment): read access to the ledger/delivery resources is consumer-governed — the package injects no read policies. README → Security carries the deny-by-default policy recipe; the resource moduledocs now carry READ-EXPOSURE warnings. (No code change: reads were always consumer-governed; the docs previously implied otherwise.)
  • Install guidance is {:ash_hooks, "~> 1.0"}; the README (previously pinned ~> 0.1.0, one feature-release behind) and tutorial both corrected, with the install-constraint check added to the release checklist.

0.2.2 — August 22, 2026

Fixed

  • usage-rules.md now ships in the hex tarball (the Ash AI-assistant convention reads it from the package) and renders on hexdocs. It was previously GitHub-only.

0.2.1 — August 22, 2026

Added

  • A runnable get-started Livebook (guided tour: inbound verify/dedup, a live local delivery, telemetry, retention) — CI-verified headless on every push. No functional changes.

0.2.0 — August 22, 2026

Added

  • Retention hooks (ADR-0005 floor completed): AshHooks.Ingress.prune/2 and AshHooks.Delivery.prune/2 (terminal rows older than a cutoff, keyed on the resource's timestamps(); non-terminal rows never deleted), and AshHooks.Ingress.redact_payload/4 (payload field-redaction under the claim fence; the original-bytes digest is preserved). Deleting a terminal row re-opens its dedup identity — set TTLs beyond replay/re-emission horizons.

0.1.1 — August 22, 2026

Changed

  • README rewritten as a package front door (no functional changes): audience/register pass; internal build references removed.

0.1.0 — August 22, 2026

Added

  • Inbound machine: AshHooks + AshHooks.InboundDelivery extensions, AshHooks.Ingress (verify-before-trust, fenced unique-ingest dedup ledger, lease-based claim, crash-window re-drive), provider behavior with ComplyCube/HubSpot v3 references and a test provider.
  • Outbound machine: AshHooks.dispatch/4 fanout with per-endpoint isolation and enqueue-repair CAS; AshHooks.OutboundDelivery, AshHooks.Subscription, AshHooks.Endpoint extensions.
  • Delivery runtime (AshHooks.Delivery) + host-injected use AshHooks.Worker: Standard-Webhooks signing (standard/dual/legacy envelopes), row-owned retry policy (Retry-After, jittered backoff, dead-letter ceiling), 410 durable disable, redirect refusal, send-time SSRF re-check.
  • AshHooks.Http adapter behavior with a memory-bounded native HTTP/1.1 default (AshHooks.Http.Bounded — every read capped under all framings) and an OTP :httpc alternative.
  • Response-snippet redaction floor (ADR-0005 amendment): no body bytes by default (fixed-grammar status + allowlisted content-type summary); per-call snippet_capture opt-in under the in-package redaction floor (NFKC homoglyph folding, bounded-fixpoint decode chain, separator-tolerant markers, ≥16-char union-alphabet entropy rule); fail-closed consumer snippet_redactor callback; [captured] marking.
  • Telemetry (ADR-0005 floor: ids/integers/fixed atoms/classified reasons only — never secrets or bodies): ingress verify/dedup/claim, dispatch enqueue_failed, delivery attempt/result/backoff/dead_letter/ disable; AshHooks.Telemetry.fingerprint/1.
  • Igniter installer, DSL cheat sheets, get-started tutorial, usage-rules.md.

Security

  • Package floors shipped in-code (ADR-0005): secrets as sources only (literals rejected at parse), default-deny machine-written ledger fields, SSRF guard at registration and send, NO headers stored on either ledger at all, no response-body persistence by default, classified-only error strings.