1.1.1 → 1.2.0+

Multi-tenancy is available and opt-in (ADR-0011)

Nothing changes unless you declare multitenancy on the four resources (Subscription, Endpoint, both ledgers). If you do, read the adoption checklist (documentation/tutorials/tenancy-adoption-checklist.md) — the ordered transition for populated tables is backfill the tenant attribute → regenerate identity indexes → enable multitenant dispatch. A NULL-tenant legacy row forms a shadow partition: new tenant-bearing upserts create parallel rows and strand effect-once.

Two obligations for multi-tenant adopters:

  1. Drain in-flight 1.1.x Oban jobs before serving multitenant dispatch. Pre-tenancy job args carry no tenant and fail closed ({:error, :tenant_required}) against multitenant resources — correct, but noisy. Drain first.
  2. String tenants are the supported job-args shape. The worker serializes the row's tenant into Oban args (JSON), inverting the attribute value through the resource's tenant_from_attribute. A custom parse_attribute should pair with tenant_from_attribute (the default inverse is identity).

New heads are additive: reap/2, redact_payload/5, mark_processed/4, mark_failed/6, renew/4, claim_delivery/3 gained an optional opts (or :tenant for the prunes); all prior arities keep working. The %{endpoint_id, subscription_id, status, error} dispatch result container is now a typespec'd public contract with one NEW status: :reconciled.

1.0.4 → 1.1.0+

Elixir 1.20+ required (previously 1.17+)

The supported Elixir window is now ~> 1.20. Applications resolving ash_hooks on Elixir 1.17–1.19 get a hard resolver error at deps loadpaths instead of a compile. Per ADR-0010 rule 4 a supported-floor bump ships as a MINOR release — so a ~> 1.0 pin will happily resolve 1.1.0 and then fail resolution on old Elixirs. If you cannot move to Elixir 1.20 yet, pin the floor release instead:

{:ash_hooks, "~> 1.0.4"}

1.0.3 → 1.0.4+

Behavior corrections (all also under "Fixed" in the CHANGELOG; no API change):

1. Event ids and types are bounded by BYTES, not characters

AshHooks.Event.new/1 and dispatch previously accepted ids and types up to 255 characters (graphemes). Long multi-byte values could pass that check and then fail the delivery write — under Ash 3.33's :codepoints counting, every endpoint's dispatch errored on an event the library had validated. Ids and types are now rejected above 255 bytes at Event.new/1, with a clear error. If you build event types from multi-byte text, values between 255 characters and 255 bytes now fail fast at construction — which, under :codepoints, previously failed (less clearly) at dispatch.

2. Captured snippets and error fields are byte-capped

The 2048-character snippet cap and 255-character error-summary caps counted graphemes; they now cap bytes (on a codepoint boundary). Captured diagnostic snippets of multi-byte content come out slightly shorter, and a hostile response body built from combining characters can no longer crash the post-send ledger write — the same applies to thrown/exit error classifications.

3. Handler failures with invalid-UTF-8 binaries still record

A handler returning {:error, :retry | :permanent, term} where term is invalid UTF-8 previously made the failure-recording write itself fail, so the delivery stayed re-drivable with no record. It now records [binary] as the error class.

Ash 3.33+: the required default_string_length_count config

Ash 3.33 made config :ash, :default_string_length_count REQUIRED for every application that compiles Ash resources — resource compilation fails until it is set. This is an Ash-level requirement (part of the fix for GHSA-cwjv-574p-59f6, where grapheme-based counting let values built from unbounded combining characters through max_length limits), not an ash_hooks one; ash_hooks writes no :ash configuration for you. Set it in your application's config/config.exs:

# Recommended: counts unicode codepoints, so max_length bounds value
# size and validation matches how SQL data layers count.
config :ash, default_string_length_count: :codepoints

# Keeps pre-3.33 behavior: graphemes are counted when validating in
# Elixir; a single grapheme can carry unboundedly many codepoints, so
# max_length does not bound the size of a value.
config :ash, default_string_length_count: :mixed

ash_hooks works under both. One nuance worth knowing: the fields ash_hooks injects onto ledger and delivery resources carry max_length constraints (event ids and error summaries at 255, response snippets at 2048). Under :codepoints those bounds limit codepoints; under :mixed, Elixir-side validation of the same constraints counts graphemes — the exact tradeoff Ash documents for your own attributes. The diagnostic response-snippet capture is capped in bytes (on a codepoint boundary), so a captured snippet always satisfies its constraint under either mode. Your application owns the choice. See Ash's backwards-compatibility config guide for per-attribute overrides.

1.0.1 → 1.0.2+

Two behavior corrections to know about (both security-posture fixes; no API change):

1. The alternate :httpc adapter refuses literal-IP HTTPS

AshHooks.Http.Httpc (NOT the default) now returns {:error, :ip_literal_https_needs_bounded} for https://<ip-literal> destinations. It previously validated only the chain — which let any chain-valid certificate authenticate the endpoint IP. The default adapter (AshHooks.Http.Bounded) enforces the iPAddress-SAN floor and keeps working; if you swapped to :httpc AND deliver to literal-IP HTTPS endpoints, switch those deliveries back (or drop the :http override).

2. use AshHooks.Worker no longer drops :http_opts

http_opts: was accepted and silently ignored; it now threads to the adapter. A config that passed it with a wrong shape could start behaving differently (correctly) — see the :cacerts seam in the README/CHANGELOG for the intended use (private-CA bundles: compile-time literals, or {m, f, a} resolved per-perform for computed values).

0.2.x → 1.0.0

1.0.0 is the semver freeze (ADR-0010). There are no public API removals or renames from 0.2.x — upgrading is a version bump plus three behavior corrections to know about:

1. Truncated chunked bodies now retry (they previously "succeeded")

AshHooks.Http.Bounded (the default adapter) returns {:error, :truncated_body} when a chunked response ends early — exactly as it already did for Content-Length responses. In 0.2.x the chunked path returned a partial body as success, which could mark a delivery :succeeded on partial bytes. If a receiver of yours streams chunked responses and closes mid-body, deliveries now retry instead of silently truncating.

2. AshHooks.Delivery.prune/2 returns {:error, error} instead of raising

Calling it on a delivery resource without inserted_at now returns the same error-tuple contract as AshHooks.Ingress.prune/2 (the @spec always promised this shape). If you rescued the old ArgumentError, replace it with an {:error, error} match.

3. Literal-IP https endpoints actually work now

The literal-IP certificate check (IP must appear in the certificate's iPAddress SAN, ADR-0009) was dead-on-arrival in 0.2.x — it rejected every literal-IP https endpoint fail-closed with :cert_ip_mismatch. It now verifies correctly: endpoints whose certs carry the IP SAN deliver; certs without it still fail closed. No action needed unless you had worked around the rejection.

Install constraint

{:ash_hooks, "~> 1.0"}

Semver from here

~> 1.0 now means: breaking changes only in 2.0, deprecations run two minors minimum, safety corrections ship as fixes even where the defective behavior was depended on (ADR-0010).