1.0.1 → 1.0.2+
Two behavior corrections to know about (both security-posture fixes; no API change):
1. The alternate :httpc adapter refuses literal-IP HTTPS
AshHooks.Http.Httpc (NOT the default) now returns {:error, :ip_literal_https_needs_bounded}
for https://<ip-literal> destinations. It previously validated only the chain — which let
any chain-valid certificate authenticate the endpoint IP. The default adapter
(AshHooks.Http.Bounded) enforces the iPAddress-SAN floor and keeps working; if you swapped
to :httpc AND deliver to literal-IP HTTPS endpoints, switch those deliveries back (or drop
the :http override).
2. use AshHooks.Worker no longer drops :http_opts
http_opts: was accepted and silently ignored; it now threads to the adapter. A config that
passed it with a wrong shape could start behaving differently (correctly) — see the :cacerts
seam in the README/CHANGELOG for the intended use (private-CA bundles: compile-time literals,
or {m, f, a} resolved per-perform for computed values).
0.2.x → 1.0.0
1.0.0 is the semver freeze (ADR-0010). There are no public API removals or renames from 0.2.x — upgrading is a version bump plus three behavior corrections to know about:
1. Truncated chunked bodies now retry (they previously "succeeded")
AshHooks.Http.Bounded (the default adapter) returns {:error, :truncated_body} when a
chunked response ends early — exactly as it already did for Content-Length responses. In
0.2.x the chunked path returned a partial body as success, which could mark a delivery
:succeeded on partial bytes. If a receiver of yours streams chunked responses and
closes mid-body, deliveries now retry instead of silently truncating.
2. AshHooks.Delivery.prune/2 returns {:error, error} instead of raising
Calling it on a delivery resource without inserted_at now returns the same error-tuple
contract as AshHooks.Ingress.prune/2 (the @spec always promised this shape). If you
rescued the old ArgumentError, replace it with an {:error, error} match.
3. Literal-IP https endpoints actually work now
The literal-IP certificate check (IP must appear in the certificate's iPAddress SAN,
ADR-0009) was dead-on-arrival in 0.2.x — it rejected every literal-IP https endpoint
fail-closed with :cert_ip_mismatch. It now verifies correctly: endpoints whose certs
carry the IP SAN deliver; certs without it still fail closed. No action needed unless
you had worked around the rejection.
Install constraint
{:ash_hooks, "~> 1.0"}Semver from here
~> 1.0 now means: breaking changes only in 2.0, deprecations run two minors minimum,
safety corrections ship as fixes even where the defective behavior was depended on
(ADR-0010).